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FROZEN IN TIME: THE STATE ACTION
DOCTRINE'S APPLICATION TO
AMATEUR SPORTS
DIONNE L. KOLLER t
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has made clear that "[t]he Constitution
constrains governmental action 'by whatever instruments or in
whatever modes that action may be taken.' "1 This sweeping
promise, however, rings hollow in the area of amateur athletics,
where amateur athletes and others are, in a very real sense,
caught in what the Supreme Court calls the "essential
dichotomy"2 between entities that are public, and therefore
subject to the limitations of the Constitution, and those that are
private, and consequently are not so limited. For nearly two
decades, since the Supreme Court's decisions in San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee3 and
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian,4 both the
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and the
United States Olympic Committee ("USOC") have been
considered by courts and commentators to be "private" entities,
and not state actors, meaning that constitutional protections do
not apply to their actions. These decisions illustrate not only the
troubled nature of the so-called "state action doctrine," but also
the extraordinary consequence of the doctrine's application in the
amateur sports context. In short, a static conception of the
t Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Baltimore School of Law. I would
like to thank Michele Gilman, Leigh Goodmark, Michael Meyerson, Ryan
Rodenberg, Steven Shapiro, and Maureen Weston for their insightful comments on
earlier drafts of this article, and Seth Yaffo for assistance with research.
I Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (quoting Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880)).
2 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
3 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
4 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
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USOC and the NCAA has developed, so that they are considered
private as a matter of law.
This static notion of the relationship between these entities
and the government has created what is essentially a legal
twilight zone where the Constitution is not applied to exercises of
state power 5 in amateur sports. This Article explores that
twilight zone and argues that it has created significant,
unintended consequences. Part II of this Article explains the
state action doctrine and its application to amateur sports,
detailing the state action requirement generally and explaining
the major cases applying the state action doctrine to the NCAA,
the USOC, and state high school athletic associations. Part III
explains the consequences of these cases. Specifically, this part
argues that the Supreme Court's holdings in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics and Tarkanian have had the effect of holding the
USOC and NCAA to be private actors as a matter of law.
Moreover, this static conception of the USOC and NCAA as
private actors has provided a powerful incentive for the
government to pursue policy objectives, such as combating
performance-enhancing drug use through amateur sports
regulation, without its methods being subject to constitutional
constraint. Finally, this Article asserts that the application of
the state action doctrine to amateur sports organizations in a
way that denies amateur athletes constitutional protections does
not serve the goals of the state action doctrine, but actually
undermines the legitimacy of the entities whose "autonomy" the
doctrine purportedly aims to protect.
I. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AND AMATEUR SPORTS
To properly examine the consequences of the state action
doctrine's application to amateur sports organizations, the state
action requirement itself and the prominent state action-amateur
sport cases must be reviewed.
A. The State Action Requirement
The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution prohibit government action that deprives
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
5 This Article uses the terms "state" and "state power" to mean exercises of
authority by both the federal and state governments.
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law.' 6 The Supreme Court has held that this prohibition applies
only to actions taken by the state-so called "state action."7 This
requirement dates back to shortly after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In 1883, in The Civil Rights Cases, the
Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a
Reconstruction Era statute that sought to prohibit racial
discrimination in restaurants and other privately-owned
ventures.8  Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court held that "[iut is state action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."9  The
Supreme Court has subsequently explained that with respect to
constitutional due process protections, "this Court in the Civil
Rights Cases ... affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in
that Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to
scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, 'however
discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth
Amendment offers no shield."10
The Supreme Court's primary justification for the state
action doctrine is that it "preserves an area of individual
freedom" and limits the reach of government power, specifically
the power of the judiciary." Thus, the doctrine preserves
individual autonomy by ensuring that private individuals can act
without being subject to the limits of the Constitution.1 2 In
addition, the doctrine serves the interests of federalism, by
allowing the states to determine to what extent private conduct
should be regulated.' 3 Indeed, promoting liberty and limiting
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; accord U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883); see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507-08 (1985).
8 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4, 18-19; Francisco M. Ugarte,
Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights Cases, 41 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 481, 496-97 (2006).
9 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (1883); see DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (stating that the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment "was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that
the State protected them from each other.").
10 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (quoting Shelley v.
Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
11 See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
12 See id. at 936; DeShaney, 489 U.S at 196 (explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects "'against unwarranted government interference'" (quoting
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982))).
13 See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine:
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government power are bedrock principles of constitutional law,
and the notion that it is important to make a distinction between
areas of life that are public and those that are private intuitively
makes sense. It is believed that there are certain spheres of life,
such as amateur athletics, which are private, so that the state is
not, and should not, be involved. 14 Effectuating this distinction,
there are two ways in which an entity can be held to be a state
actor subject to constitutional standards. Most obviously is the
case where the challenged action was taken by the state itself,
through a state agency or state official. 15 The second instance
involves the more complicated scenario where the challenged
action was taken by a private actor, but the state is so closely
involved in the conduct of the private actor that it can be said
that the challenged action was, in effect, the work of the state. 16
The state action inquiry is also used to determine whether a
party acted "under color of state law" for purposes of claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17
The Supreme Court's willingness to find that a private actor
is engaged in state action has changed over time. Starting in the
1950s, the Court took a fairly liberal view of the state action
requirement, such that "by 1970 the Court was able and
apparently willing to find state action in almost any situation."18
However, in the 1970s and 1980s the Court significantly shifted
its approach and strengthened the requirement so that it was far
more difficult to show state action. 19 Specifically, in 1982, the
Court decided three cases that narrowed the scope of the state
The Search for Government Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 339 (1997);
Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 542-43.
14 See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1323 (1982) (discussing "our
psychological and ideological need to believe that there are essentially private
realms, albeit circumscribed by state and society, in which actions are autonomous").
15 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
16 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1995); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848 (1982).
17 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936, 942.
18 Recent Development, Constitutional Law--State Action Doctrine Invoked as a
Limitation upon the Reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1237,
1237 (1972).
19 See id.; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1413 (2003) (noting that the Court is "significantly more unwilling to find
state action and hold private individuals to constitutional requirements"); Hayward
D. Reynolds, Deconstructing State Action: The Politics of State Action, 20 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 847, 890 (1994).
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action doctrine. In Blum v. Yaretsky, 20 the Court held that the
decision to transfer Medicaid patients residing in private nursing
homes was not state action, noting that it was the private
nursing home and its private physicians who ultimately made
the decision to transfer. 21 Moreover, the Court held that the
mere regulation of the treatment the patients received and the
subsidy through the Medicaid program was not enough for state
action.22 Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,23 the Court held
that a private high school for troubled students was not engaged
in state action when it terminated one of its teachers, despite the
fact that the school was regulated by the state and the school
received nearly all of its funding from the state.24 Finally, in
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,25 the Court held that there was state
action where a private creditor obtained a pre-judgment writ of
attachment of the debtor's property.26 The Court found that the
attachment of property was joint action between the private
creditor and the state, which issued the writ. In Lugar, the
Court announced a two-part analysis for determining whether
seemingly private conduct could be attributed to the state. First,
the challenged action
must be caused by the exercise of [a] right or privilege created
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the or by a
person for whom the State is responsible ... [and], second, the
party charged with the deprivation of rights must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor... [either] because he
is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. 27
As will be discussed below, these three cases set the stage for the
state action decisions involving the USOC and the NCAA.
There are now several theories that the Supreme Court has
used to determine when the actions of a private actor will be
subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Court has looked at
whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
20 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
21 Id. at 1006-07.
22 Id. at 1004-05.
23 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
24 Id. at 840.
25 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
26 Id. at 922, 942.
27 Id. at 937.
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and the challenged action. ' 28 The Court has also explained that
private action can become the action of the state where the state
"has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in
law be deemed to be that of the State,"' 29 or where the private
entity acts as a "willful participant in joint activity with the State
or its agents."30 The Court also has found state action where a
private actor is "controlled by an 'agency of the state'" or when
the private actor has been delegated a function that has been
"'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.'"31 More
recently, the Court stated that the "pervasive entwinement" of
state officials in the structure of an ostensibly private entity
would be enough to support a finding of state action. 32
In short, the Court has made clear that constitutional
standards apply only when the alleged infringement of "federal
right[s] be fairly attributable to the State"33 or "when it can be
said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct" at
issue.34 However, as the Court explained in Brentwood Academy
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n ("Brentwood 1"), the
analysis of what conduct the state is "responsible for" is not one
that is undertaken with reference to bright-line rules or specific
criteria.3 5  Instead, the Court stated that "no one fact can
function as a necessary condition across the board for finding
state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient,
for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing
activity to the government."36  Thus, the Court stated that
"examples may be the best teachers."37
28 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974); see also Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722, 725 (1961).
29 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
30 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
31 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531
U.S. 288, 296 (2001) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dir. of City Trusts of Phila., 353
U.S. 230, 231 (1957)); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quoting
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946). See generally Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953) (discussing that prevention of discrimination against voters because of
their race is a national policy and therefore the concern of the government).
32 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 291.
33 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
34 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
35 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 295.
36 Id. at 295-96.
37 Id. at 296.
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Because of the varying formulations of the state action
doctrine, it has been a target of scholarly criticism for decades. 38
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's state
action jurisprudence lacks coherence. 39 Others have advocated
eliminating the requirement altogether. 40  Still others have
stated that the state action doctrine is "both grounded in racism
and an obstacle to the full effectuation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."41 Some have even argued that the doctrine was so
flawed that it would cease to exist.42 A central feature of the
commentary over the state action doctrine is the desirability and
feasibility of distinguishing public from private acts.43 Scholars
have argued that it is impossible to distinguish the two, because
of legal positivist notions that all conduct can be traced to some
decision of the state to either affirmatively permit the conduct, or
a decision not to prohibit it. 44 Regardless of whether such lines
between public and private conduct can be drawn, the Supreme
Court continues to draw it by relying on the state action doctrine.
Yet wherever and however that "state action" line is drawn,
one thing is constant. The doctrine captures the particular
circumstances of a relationship between a private entity and the
government, and, based on those circumstances, categorizes the
private entity as either "private" or "public." Recognizing that
relationships are dynamic in nature and change over time and
38 E.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 91 (1967) ("On the cases and on the
opinions, 'state action' is a doctrine in trouble."); Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 503;
Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of
Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053,
1053-54 (1990); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347
(1963).
39 Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the Fourteenth Amendment; State
Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 Mo. L. REV. 499, 509-11 (1994); Snyder, supra
note 38, at 1054-55.
40 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 506-07, 550.
41 Ugarte, supra note 8, at 482.
42 John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on
the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855, 872 (1966); Williams, supra
note 38, at 382, 389.
43 See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction,
and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT 329, 334 (1993)
("The overwhelming weight of published academic opinion has rejected the premise
that legal doctrine can rest on a supposed distinction between public and private
actions.").
44 Id.; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1982).
2008]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
through circumstance, the state action doctrine does not have one
formulation-and as the Court indicates-is found through a
case-by-case inquiry. As explained below, it is in this way that
the state action doctrine as applied to amateur sports is
problematic. By adopting a static notion of how amateur
sports organizations relate to the government, and how the
government relates to them, courts and commentators have
invited the government to exercise far greater power through and
over amateur athletics.
B. The State Action-Amateur Sport Cases
Several notable state action cases involve amateur sports.
This likely reflects sports programs' integration with public
educational institutions and the federal government's growing
interest in amateur sports as part of larger policy agendas, such
as fighting drug use. To be sure, there is state action to support
a constitutional challenge against an entity such as a public high
school or university that takes action against a student-athlete,
or another individual. 45 However, the area that has produced
noteworthy state action litigation, and on which this article is
focused, concerns organizations such as the NCAA and the USOC
that are without a doubt shaped and influenced by state power,
but structurally maintain a "private," non-governmental status.
The result is that these entities operate in a legal twilight zone,
caught between the state's undeniable interest in and temptation
to regulate amateur sports, and the common wisdom that sport is
"cprivate."
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association-National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian
The NCAA is a tax-exempt, non-profit, voluntary46 member-
45 See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
46 Critics have noted that the NCAA is not a voluntary organization from the
perspective of the student-athletes who are regulated by its actions:
I have heard the Chairman and others talk about a voluntary organization.
I think that anybody that has studied the NCAA readily realizes that the
athletes are not members nor are they invited to be members.., and they
have no input, but they are controlled... And who has been victimized by
this? It is the student-athlete.
Due Process and the NCAA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judicary, 108th Cong. 3-4 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution).
[Vol. 82:183
FROZEN IN TIME
ship association dedicated to the promotion of inter-collegiate
athletics.47  Confirming that athletics are a "vital part" of
education, the basic purpose of the NCAA, as stated in its
constitution, is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an
integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body."48 The NCAA's rules apply to
issues including recruitment of student-athletes, academic
eligibility, and financial aid.49 The NCAA also has a program for
drug testing athletes. Despite its regulation of virtually every
aspect of a student's athletic experience, critics have stated that
student-athlete welfare is not one of the NCAA's central
concerns. 50  Instead, the NCAA's focus is on its member
institutions, as the NCAA has been characterized as the
"organization through which many of the nation's colleges and
universities act and speak on national athletic matters.."51
The NCAA consists of over 1,200 public and private
institutions and athletic conferences. 52  Nearly all public and
private colleges and universities with major athletic programs
are members of the NCAA and therefore have agreed to conduct
their programs in accordance with the NCAA's rules and
regulations.53 It is public universities, however, that make up
the majority of the NCAA's membership. Currently, there are
over 300,000 student-athletes competing for NCAA-member
schools. 54 The student-athletes who compete for NCAA-member
schools are not NCAA members themselves, but they are
47 See NCAA Website: The Online Resource for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "About the NCAA" hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 15, 2007).
48 John Kitchin, The NCAA and Due Process, 5 KAN J.L. & PUB. POLY 71, 72
(1996).
49 James Arslanian, The NCAA and State Action: Does the Creature Control Its
Master?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 333, 333 (1990).
50 See W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2
VA. J. SPORTS & L. 1, 4-5 (2000).
51 Kitchin, supra note 48, at 71.
52 Matthew M. Keegan, Comment, Due Process and the NCAA: Are Innocent
Student-Athletes Afforded Adequate Protection from Improper Sanctions? A Call for
Change in the NCAA Enforcement Procedures, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 297, 299 (2005);
see also NCAA Website: The Online Resource for the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, http://www.ncaa.org (follow "Composition & Sport Sponsorship of the
Membership" hyperlink under the "Our Members" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 15,
2007).
53 Carter, supra note 50, at 6.
54 Keegan, supra note 52, at 299.
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required to follow NCAA rules. Because member schools obligate
themselves to enforce the NCAA's rules, the NCAA does not take
any direct action against student-athletes, coaches, or others who
run afoul of its regulations. If the school does not take action in
accordance with NCAA policy, the NCAA will sanction the
member school.55
The NCAA's member-institutions are assigned to particular
divisions-I, II, or III-depending upon the institution's athletic
program's size and success. Schools that are considered to have
the largest and most successful athletic programs, usually from
their football and men's basketball teams, are in Division 1.56
The NCAA currently functions through divisional management
structures with each division promulgating its own rules for
governance.57 For instance, since 1997, Division I has been
governed by a Board of Directors and Management Council,
which adopts rules that apply to all Division I institutions. This
structure differs markedly from the "one institution, one vote"
system that had been in place, and that was important to the
analysis of the state action issue in Tarkanian.58 The national
body of the NCAA no longer has broad rule-making authority.
Instead, NCAA "action" now results from the divisional level,
with much narrower participation from member schools. 59
Until 1982, the overwhelming majority of federal courts held
that the NCAA was a state actor.60  These holdings were
primarily based on the theory that the NCAA performed a
government function and that there was a close nexus between
the NCAA and the state.61 Courts focused on the fact that
coordinating college athletics was an important part of education,
and therefore a traditional government function, and that at
least half of the members of the NCAA were public institutions.62
Courts also focused on the "mutually beneficial relationship"
between the public and private entities that formed the NCAA
55 Kitchin, supra note 48, at 72.
56 Carter, supra note 50, at 6-7.
57 Id. at 28.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 38.
60 Keegan, supra note 52, at 303.
61 Id. at 303-04; see also John Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection:
What's Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 21 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 621, 642, 644 (1989).
62 See Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975).
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and the fact that state institutions wielded the majority of the
power in the organization.6 3 Courts noted that state institutions,
in addition to being a substantial portion of the NCAA's
membership, were a major force in setting NCAA policy, and that
the NCAA's actions had a governmental quality.6 4
Lower courts backed away from holding the NCAA to be a
state actor in the 1980s after the Supreme Court decided Blum,
Rendell-Baker, and Lugar, all of which limited the application of
the state action doctrine. 65 Finally, in 1988, the Supreme Court
decided Tarkanian6 and held by a margin of 5-4 that the NCAA
was not engaged in state action when it required the University
of Nevada Las Vegas ("UNLV"), a public institution, to fire its
men's basketball coach, Jerry Tarkanian. Tarkanian brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he had been deprived of
his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights when the NCAA
required UNLV to fire him based on the NCAA's findings of
wrongdoing, or risk sanctions. The Court noted that UNLV, as
an NCAA member, agreed to abide by NCAA bylaws and
enforcement proceedings conducted pursuant to those bylaws.
Accordingly, the NCAA conducted the investigation of Tarkanian
and the administration of UNLV's men's basketball program.
UNLV apparently resisted the NCAA inquiry and completed
its own investigation. It was based on the NCAA's findings,
however, that the NCAA required UNLV to sever all ties between
Tarkanian and UNLV's athletic programs or risk additional
sanctions. UNLV complied.6 7
Tarkanian argued that, by essentially forcing UNLV to
suspend him, the NCAA and UNLV were engaged in joint action
sufficient to make the NCAA a state actor.68 Tarkanian argued
that UNLV had basically delegated its authority to the NCAA to
govern its athletic program and that it clothed the NCAA in
63 See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
64 Id.
65 See Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984); see also
Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d
953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986); Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 606-07 (C.D. Ill.
1987); Kneeland v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (W.D. Tex. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 69-
70 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
66 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
67 See id. at 180-87.
68 See id. at 195, 196 n.16.
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UNLV's state status. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating in a
now famous phrase that the case required the court to "step
through an analytical looking glass to resolve" it because of the
"unique" situation it presented since the challenged action was
not taken by a private actor, as in the usual state action case, but
by UNLV, unquestionably an agent of the state. 69 The Court
then said that the inquiry came down to "whether
UNLV's actions in compliance with the NCAA's rules and
recommendations turned the NCAA's conduct into state action."70
For several reasons, the Court found that it did not. Taking
a formalistic approach, the Court noted that UNLV's influence on
the NCAA rule-making process was too minor to clothe the
NCAA in Nevada's state status because the NCAA was a huge
organization with numerous members. 71 Second, the Court found
that the NCAA had no governmental power to undertake its
investigation of UNLV. 72 The Court also stressed that there
could not be "joint action" sufficient to find state action since
UNLV resisted the NCAA's investigation of Tarkanian and the
basketball program and also had options other than compliance.
Thus, the Court reasoned that UNLV did not have to follow the
NCAA's mandate to sever ties with Tarkanian because it could
have retained him and risked more severe sanctions or simply
withdrawn from the NCAA.73
The dissent argued that the state action situation presented
by Tarkanian was not unique, but was in fact similar to prior
cases where the Court found that private actors could be engaged
in state action if they acted jointly with state officials in
undertaking the challenged action.74 The dissent explained that
there was ample evidence of such joint action in Tarkanian
because UNLV suspended Tarkanian based on violations of
NCAA rules that UNLV agreed to follow. As a result, it was the
69 See id. at 191-93.
70 Id. at 193.
71 See id. at 193, 195.
72 Id. at 197. The Court cited its ruling in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), and reaffirmed that the
regulation of amateur athletics is not a traditional public function. The Court stated
that while it had previously found the administration of inter-collegiate athletics to
be a "critical" function, it was not a "traditional, let alone an exclusive, state
function." Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 n.18.
73 See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196 & n.16, 198.
74 Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
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NCAA that conducted the investigation and hearings that formed
the basis for Tarkanian's suspension, and the findings that came
out of the investigation and subsequent hearings were binding on
UNLV. 75 The dissent stated that it was irrelevant that UNLV
had the option to withdraw from the NCAA or that UNLV and
the NCAA were adversaries throughout the investigation. What
was important, the dissent stated, was that ultimately UNLV
agreed with the NCAA to take action against Tarkanian. 76
Several states responded to the Tarkanian decision by
introducing or adopting legislation that would provide
individuals affected by NCAA investigations and sanctions with
due process protections. 77  For instance, Nevada, Nebraska,
Illinois, and Florida-all home to major NCAA Division I athletic
programs-passed legislation that required the NCAA to provide
those accused of rules violations with due process as specified in
the statutes.78 These statutes are now either no longer in effect
or their effect is in serious doubt because courts have held that
they violate the Commerce Clause.79  The Supreme Court
reaffirmed Tarkanian in 2001 in Brentwood L 80
The change from holding the NCAA to be a state actor, as
the lower courts did, to finding it was not engaged in state action
in Tarkanian, can be at least somewhat attributed to what
commentators have called the "tremendous judicial deference
and goodwill"81 that the NCAA has enjoyed in the regulation of
intercollegiate athletics. The combination of the Tarkanian
holding and lower court rulings that state statutes conferring due
process protections on athletes and others caught in NCAA
investigations violate the Commerce Clause means that the
NCAA is not subject to constitutional limitations or state
75 Id. at 200-02.
76 See id. at 202-03.
77 Keegan, supra note 52, at 319.
78 Hearing, supra note 46, at 11-12 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy Dean
and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School).
79 See Kitchin, supra note 48, at 77-78; see also NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633,
637-38 (9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating a Nevada statute that sought to impose due
process limitations on the actions of the NCAA because the NCAA was engaged in
interstate commerce and the Nevada statute therefore would have directly regulated
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause). The Ninth Circuit also
held that the statute must be struck down because its "extraterritorial effect" would
subject the NCAA to "inconsistent obligations." Id. at 640.
80 531 U.S. 288, 297-98 (2001).
Si Carter, supra note 50, at 69.
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statutes that attempt to establish due process protections for
those involved in NCAA action.8 2  In a 2004 congressional
hearing on the subject, Professor Gary Roberts explained that "it
seems reasonably clear that ... the NCAA's enforcement process
and procedures are unconstrained by either federal constitutional
or state law. Thus, the question for Congress to consider is
whether it would be appropriate for new federal legislation to
impose any procedural requirements on the NCAA .... "83 Thus
far, Congress has not adopted such legislation.
2. The United States Olympic Committee-DeFrantz v. United
States Olympic Committee and San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee
Similar to the "deference" and "goodwill" shown to the
NCAA, courts have shown great deference to the USOC in the
application of the state action doctrine. The USOC enjoys this
deference despite the fact that it is plainly not the usual "private"
actor.
Unlike many other countries, the United States does not
have an official government agency or ministry for sports. This
is because sports regulation has not traditionally been viewed as
a government matter. Although sports regulation is not a formal
part of our government structure, amateur sports issues
increasingly have become important to the United States
Government.8 4 The USOC, as it exists today, was first developed
as a result of a Presidential Commission created in 1975 to study
ways in which the United States could be more competitive in
Olympic competition. 5 The work of the Commission led to the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978,86 which made the USOC a federally-
chartered corporation. The Act gave the USOC the exclusive
82 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 11 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School); see also Sahl,
supra note 61, at 660-61.
83 Hearing, supra note 46, at 12 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy Dean
and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School).
84 Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to the Actions of the United
States Anti-Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 91, 94 (2005).
85 Exec. Order No. 11,868, 40 Fed. Reg. 26,255 (June 23, 1975).
86 Jimmy Carter, Amateur Sports Act of 1978: President's Statement on Signing
S. 2727 into Law, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1976 (Nov. 8, 1978), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30133; see also 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-12,
220521-29 (2000) (encompassing the codification of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978).
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power to coordinate and govern Olympic Movement athletics in
the United States.8 7
The federal government exercises significant influence over
the USOC. For instance, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
prior to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, President Carter
and Congress called on the USOC to boycott the Games.88 The
President, however, made clear that he would take all steps
necessary to enforce his decision not to send a team to Moscow. 8 9
Not surprisingly, the USOC voted not to send a team to the
Games. 90 These circumstances spawned the DeFrantz litigation,
explained below. More recently, Congress has taken an interest
in reforming the USOC in response to allegations of
mismanagement and ethical violations, 91 and Congress made
specific recommendations to the USOC to guide its
reorganization. Thus, although the USOC operates in many
ways as a private corporation, it is nevertheless subject to
considerable government influence. 92 As will be explained below,
the federal government's influence over the USOC allowed
Congress and the Office of National Drug Control Policy
("ONDCP") to take the lead role in establishing the United States
Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA").
Despite the strong government presence in the operation of
the USOC generally and in specific circumstances, courts have
ruled that the USOC is not a state actor. The first such case to
87 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 554
(1987).
88 Jeffrey M. Marks, Comment, Political Abuse of Olympic Sport-DeFrantz v.
United States Olympic Committee, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 155, 156 n.7 (1981-
82).
89 Id.
90 See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1182-83 (D.D.C.
1980) (declining to enjoin the USOC from carrying out its resolution of April 12,
1980, not to send a team to Moscow).
91 See Does the U.S. Olympic Committee's Organizational Structure Impede Its
Mission?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (Mar. 19, 2003)
(statement of William C. Martin, Acting President, U.S. Olympic Comm.).
92 The federal government's influence over and interest in the USOC can also be
seen in the actions of individual members of Congress who appear to have a personal
interest in matters involving the Olympics. For instance, in litigation surrounding
the selection of the 2000 Olympic Greco-Roman wrestling team, Senator Ted Stevens
wrote a letter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
weighing in on his interpretation of the Amateur Sports Act and which competitor
should be sent to the Games to represent the United States. See Lindland v. U.S.A.
Wrestling Ass'n, 227 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
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do so, DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, involved
the United States' boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.93
The claim in DeFrantz was brought by a group of Olympic
athletes who were selected to participate in the 1980 Moscow
summer Olympic Games. After President Carter determined
that the United States should not, and would not, send a team to
Moscow, and the USOC voted not to do so, the athletes brought
suit alleging that the USOC's action violated their rights under
the Amateur Sports Act and the Constitution.
The evidence indicated that President Carter and the
"Administration strenuously urged a boycott of the Moscow
games" as a sanction against the Soviet Union for its invasion of
Afghanistan. 94 As part of this effort, the President urged the
International Olympic Committee to remove the Games from
Moscow. He also announced in his State of the Union address
that he would not support sending a United States team to
compete in the Olympic Games as long as the Soviet military
forces remained in Afghanistan. Moreover, the House of
Representatives and Senate passed a resolution opposing
participation in the Olympic Games by United States athletes.
White House counsel met with the USOC Executive Board and
other USOC officers and urged them to vote against sending a
team to Moscow. President Carter also met with the Athlete's
Advisory Council of the USOC and told them that the United
States would not send a team to the Moscow Olympics. Finally,
President Carter sent a message to the USOC and stated that he
would take all legal action necessary to enforce his decision not to
send a team to Moscow. 95
Although there was considerable evidence that the federal
government-and specifically President Carter-made the
decision not to send a team to the 1980 Olympic Games, the court
held that the President and federal government only held
persuasive power over the USOC, but did not have sufficient
"control" over the entity to justify a finding of state action. The
court's analysis, however, focused relatively little on whether
there was "a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the
challenged action" as required by prior state action precedent,
but instead looked at whether in general the federal government
93 DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. at 1193.
94 Id. at 1183-84.
95 Id.
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had to approve the USOC's actions before they could be
enforced. 96 The court also noted that there was no "symbiotic
relationship" between the federal government and the USOC
because the USOC did not receive government funding.
Significantly, the court explained that finding that the President
and the government's efforts to influence the USOC to boycott
the Games was sufficient for a finding of state action would
open the door and usher the courts into what we believe is a
largely nonjusticiable realm, where they would find themselves
in the untenable position of determining whether a certain
level, intensity, or type of "Presidential" or "Administration" or
"political" pressure amounts to sufficient control over a private
entity so as to invoke federal jurisdiction. 97
Given these concerns, the court clearly was not interested in
performing a searching state action inquiry. Not surprisingly,
the DeFrantz decision was criticized.9
8
After DeFrantz, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee-a case that did not involve
the Olympic Games or an Olympic Movement athlete-the
Supreme Court ruled by a 5-4 margin that the USOC was not a
state actor. 99 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the USOC
brought suit against San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
("SFAA"), an organization that was attempting to organize and
promote the "Gay Olympic Games," to prohibit SFAA from using
the word "Olympic" in its materials. 100 SFAA defended by
arguing that its use of the Olympic mark was permissible under
the Lanham Act, and that the USOC's enforcement of its
exclusive right to the marks in this case violated the Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 10 1
The Court rejected this challenge, holding that SFAA could
not show state action. 10 2 The Court explained that extensive
regulation of a private entity "does not transform the actions of
the regulated entity into those of the government."'1 3 Second, the
Court stated that the USOC's receipt of government funding did
96 Id. at 1193-94 (emphasis added).
97 Id. at 1194.
98 Marks, supra note 88, at 157.
99 483 U.S. 522, 547-48 (1987).
100 Id. at 525, 527.
101 Id. at 530, 542.
102 Id. at 544-45.
103 Id. at 544.
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not alter the analysis. 10 4 - The Court stated that "[t]he
Government may subsidize private entities without assuming
constitutional responsibility for their actions. ' 105 Finally, the
Court rejected the "public function" analysis, stating that while
the USOC's activities served "a national interest," this fact was
not enough to make the USOC's actions governmental action. 106
The Court stated that "[n]either the conduct nor the coordination
of amateur sports has been a traditional governmental
function."10 7 Moreover, the Court explained that the facts did not
show that the government "coerced or encouraged the USOC" in
its decision to deny SFAA the use of the Olympic mark.108
Justice Brennan's dissent argued that the USOC was a
government actor under both the traditional government
function analysis and the "close nexus" analysis. 09 The dissent
noted that the USOC performs a "distinctive, traditional
governmental function" by representing the United States to the
world and explained that this function has become increasingly
important as the Olympic Games have grown in importance. 110
The dissent used the example of the 1980 Olympic boycott to
argue that the Olympics had an important place in American
foreign policy, and that the 1980 experience "laid bare the impact
and interrelationship of USOC decisions on the definition and
pursuit of the national interest." '11  The dissent explained,
however, that the function of the USOC was more than just
representing the United States and its interests, but was also to
perform a function that the private sector had never performed,
which is to coordinate Olympic Movement sports. In doing this,
the dissent noted, the USOC was endowed by Congress with
unique authority to serve an important government interest, and
in this way the federal government and the USOC exist in a
"symbiotic relationship."' 1 2 Accordingly, the dissent noted that
104 Id.
105 Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 545.
108 Id. at 547.
109 Id. at 548-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 550.
111 Id. at 551-53.
112 Id. at 556-57 (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961)).
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Congress put the "power and prestige of the United States
Government" behind the USOC.113
Like DeFrantz, San Francisco Arts & Athletics was criticized.
As one commentator noted: "[Iun San Francisco Arts and
Athletics, almost all types of Government involvement were
existent and nevertheless, according to the majority stopped
short of finding state action."114 The Court's unwillingness, in
both Tarkanian and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, to find state
action, even in the face of considerable evidence of state
involvement in the challenged entities, solidified the notion that
courts will not intrude in the affairs of amateur sports
organizations by allowing constitutional challenges to their
actions. This stance, as explained below, has opened the door to
ever-increasing involvement by the state in amateur athletics.
3. State High School Athletic Associations-Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n
A notable exception to the general rule that the Constitution
does not apply to entities involved with amateur athletics is the
case of state high school athletic associations. A majority of cases
hold that such associations are state actors, because in most
cases they actually function as state agencies. 1 5 Brentwood I
involves a classic example of such an entity."16 In that case, the
Supreme Court found that the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association ("TSSAA") was engaged in state action in
enforcing a recruiting rule against a private school member of the
association. The TSSAA had been held to be a state actor in the
past, when it was statutorily recognized as an instrumentality of
the state. In response to that previous litigation, the statutory
designation was changed, but little else about the workings of the
113 Id. at 559.
114 Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1182 (1995); see also Buchanan, supra note 13, at 407
(explaining that "[t]he opinion reveals little, if any, effort to consider the combined
force of all relevant factors in relation to the state action issue"); Mitchell L.
Beckloff, Comment, State Action in San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee: Let the Games Begin, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 654
(1989).
115 Thomas A. Mayes, Comment, Tonya Harding's Case: Contractual Due
Process, the Amateur Athlete, and the American Ideal of Fair Play, 3 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 109, 133 (1995).
116 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531
U.S. 288, 290-92 (2001).
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TSSAA did. The Supreme Court therefore held, by a margin of 5-
4, that the state ultimately was responsible for the decisions of
the TSSAA because public officials were "pervasively entwined"
in the management and control of the association. 117
The Court found that the state was entwined with the
TSSAA from the "top down" in that employees of the State Board
of Education sat on many of the athletic association's committees,
and employees of the athletic association were part of the state
retirement system.118 The state was also entwined from the
"bottom up" in that an overwhelming majority of the members of
the association were public high schools represented by school
principals and others acting in their official capacities. 11 9 The
Court noted that "[t]here would be no recognizable Association,
legal or tangible, without the public school officials, who do not
merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the purely
ministerial acts by which the Association exists and
functions .. ,,120 The TSSAA argued that a finding of state
action would have dire consequences for the association, as it
would trigger an avalanche of litigation against the association
that would impair significantly its ability to regulate athletics.
The Court dismissed this argument, noting that "pleas for special
treatment are hard to sell."121
The dissent in Brentwood I was interesting not simply
because it rejected the notion that "mere entwinement" could
support a finding of state action;1 22 the dissent also took an
analytical approach that differed from the approach taken by the
majority in Tarkanian, where the Court rejected the state action
argument. In Tarkanian, the Court focused heavily on the
formal relationship between UNLV and the NCAA and gave little
weight to the particulars of the action taken by the NCAA and
UNLV against Tarkanian. Had the majority done so, the dissent
in Tarkanian argued, a finding of state action under the "joint
action" theory would necessarily have followed. In Brentwood I,
the dissent advocated a different approach, looking less at the
117 Id. at 298 ("The nominally private character of the [Athletic] Association is
overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in
its composition and workings .....
118 Id. at 300.
119 Id. at 299-300.
120 Id. at 300.
121 Id. at 305.
122 Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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entity's relationship with the state, which the majority found
inescapably evidenced state action, and instead analyzed the
facts by explaining that the state had no involvement, under any
theory, in the particular challenged action-the enforcement of
the recruiting rule against Brentwood Academy.
As a matter of state action jurisprudence, Brentwood I has
been criticized as adding to the general incoherence of the
doctrine by articulating yet another test for determining when
the actions of a private entity have a sufficient nexus with the
state to amount to state action. 123 Yet whatever it means for the
state action doctrine generally, Brentwood I already has had an
important impact in terms of the application of the state action
doctrine to amateur sports. 124 First, the Court in Brentwood I
clearly signaled that it would not turn a blind eye to the clear
presence of the state in a purportedly private organization.'
25 It
would not, the majority stated, be swayed by formal declarations
of an entity's "private" status where it operates, through "winks
and nods," in concert with the state.126  This is significant
because, in the amateur sports context, there are many such
"winks and nods." Yet, while the Court signaled it may be more
willing to look behind amateur sports regulators' assertion of
"private" status, it also contributed to the static conception of the
NCAA as a private actor by reaffirming Tarkanian. As will be
discussed below, "freezing" the status of the NCAA and the
USOC has had important consequences.
123 Id. at 303.
124 The state action holding was not examined by the Supreme Court in the
recently-announced decision in Brentwood II, which considered the merits of the
First Amendment challenge to one of the TSSAA's recruiting rules, although Justice
Thomas stated in his concurring opinion that he would have overruled Brentwood I
because it "departed so dramatically from our earlier state action cases." Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood I), 127 S. Ct. 2489,
2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
125 The Brentwood I majority noted that the state "once freely acknowledged the
Association's official character but now does it by winks and nods." Brentwood I, 531
U.S. at 301. It went on to add that the "significance of winks and nods in state action
doctrine" was one of the areas where the dissent disagreed with the majority,
explaining that the dissent preferred a more formalistic approach to the analysis,
rather than one based on "practical certainty." Id. at 301 n.4. The majority stated
that "if formalism were the sine qua non of state action, the doctrine would vanish
owing to the ease and inevitability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism
has never been controlling." Id.
126 Id. at 301.
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II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STATE ACTION-AMATEUR
SPORT CASES
It might be assumed that the obvious consequence of the
state action-amateur sport cases is that, consistent with the goals
of the state action doctrine, the liberty of sports regulators such
as the USOC and the NCAA is enhanced because courts are not
imposing constitutional requirements on their actions. That is,
the government, in the form of the judicial branch, is not
intruding on the "private" realm of amateur sports regulation.
To some extent, the state action-amateur sport cases achieve
these goals. Amateur sports organizations, like the USOC and
the NCAA, are free to manage the athletes and athletic
competitions within their respective jurisdictions without fear of
constitutional litigation. They can give athletes and others the
due process of their own design without considering whether
such procedures would pass constitutional muster. Giving sports
organizations "room" in this regard can be important, so that
the rules of the game, so to speak, prevail. This beneficial
consequence is underscored by amateur sports regulators, who
commonly assert that there would be dire consequences if the
state action doctrine were applied to allow constitutional
litigation to go forward against them. 127 Such consequences,
amateur sports organizations assert, would include a wave of
litigation that would destroy the entities' budgets and render
them incapable of effectively regulating athletics. 128  These
predictions of disaster, while found to be unconvincing by the
Court in Brentwood I, may contribute significantly to courts'
unwillingness to hold that amateur sports organizations are
engaged in state action.
Yet while doomsday consequences of a state action finding
are frequently predicted by amateur sports organizations, what
is not examined are the actual consequences of holding that
entities such as the NCAA and the USOC are private actors. As
explained below, a closer look at the consequences of San
Francisco Arts & Athletics and Tarkanian reveals not that the
"private realm" of amateur athletics has been protected and
127 See id. at 304 (citing Brief for Respondents at 35, Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 532 U.S. 288 (2001) (No. 99-901)).
128 Such an argument is frequently made in the anti-doping context, where it is
commonly believed that constitutional litigation would significantly weaken an
entity like the USADA because of the costs involved.
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enhanced, but that there has been a quite different and
paradoxical result.
A. The Constitutional Status of Amateur Sports Organizations
Has Been "Frozen"
Commentators have noted that "[n]ew forms of governmental
activities ... change the reality of state actions. ' 129 This has
certainly been the case with amateur sports, where the
increasing role of the government has changed the reality of state
involvement. Yet, the law has not, and under current
formulations will not, keep up with this changed reality.
Instead, what has happened is precisely what Justice Brennan
foreshadowed in his dissent in San Francisco Arts & Athletics.
Justice Brennan warned that a narrow interpretation of the state
action doctrine would, in essence, "freeze into law a static
conception of government," so that "our judicial theory of
government action would cease to resemble contemporary,
experience."' 3 0  Indeed, this "freezing," to a large extent, 
has4
occurred in the area of amateur sports, where a powerful ripple
effect was created by the decisions in Tarkanian, DeFrantz, and
San Francisco Arts & Athletics.13' Lower courts and legal
scholars have assumed that the USOC and the NCAA are not
state actors as a matter of law.1 32 Thus, common wisdom that the
129 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1191.
130 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 549 n.1
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Interestingly, this "freezing" seems only to operate one way. There does not
seem to be any notion that Brentwood I, which held a high school athletic association
to be a state actor, has frozen a conception of all high school athletic associations as
public actors as a matter of law. Indeed, the TSSAA is still litigating the state action
issue, asking the Supreme Court to overrule its previous finding that it was a state
actor when it sanctioned member-school Brentwood Academy.
132 See, e.g., Harding v. U.S. Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D.
Or. 1994), vacated, 879 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1995); Beckloff, supra note 114, at
644-45; Douglas Bryant, Comment, A Level Playing Field? The NCAA's Freshman
Eligibility Standards Violate Title VI, but the Problems Can Be Solved, 32 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 305, 325 (2001); Carter, supra note 50, at 80; Michael G. Dawson,
Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian: Supreme Court Upholds
NCAA's Private Status Under Fourteenth Amendment, Repelling Shark's Attack on
NCAA's Disciplinary Powers, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 217, 235-36 (1989); Amanda N.
Luftman, Comment, Does the NCAA's Football Rule 9-2 Impede the Free Exercise of
Religion on the Playing Field?, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 445, 448 (1995); Mayes,
supra note 115, at 130-31; Paul C. McCaffrey, Note, Playing Fair: Why the United
States Anti-Doping Agency's Performance-Enhanced Adjudications Should Be
Treated as State Action, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 645, 667 (2006).
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USOC and the NCAA are "private" has evolved to be a static,
settled principle of law. This static view of the state action
doctrine prevents the law from accounting for an increased
government presence in amateur athletic regulation. This view
also has acted as a virtual invitation to the government to
exercise increasing levels of involvement in amateur sports
without corresponding constitutional restraints, as a means of
promoting government policies. Therefore, the current
application of the state action doctrine to amateur sports
organizations undermines their legitimacy more than it enhances
their liberty.
The Supreme Court's formulation of the state action doctrine
seems to negate the possibility of "freezing" a conception of an
entity and its relationship with the government, such that the
entity can be held as a matter of law to be, or not be, a
state actor. The Court has stated that the state action inquiry
is "necessarily fact-bound,"133  and that the state action
determination can only be conducted by "sifting facts and
weighing circumstances."'134 The Court has also stressed that no
one set of facts or circumstances is sufficient to find state
action.135 Finally, there are several different theories upon which
state action can be found and the Supreme Court has emphasized
that it is not relevant whether state action might be lacking
under certain theories if there is at least one that is sufficient. 136
Despite these admonitions, however, the state-action amateur
sport cases are generally interpreted as establishing the NCAA
and USOC's constitutional status as a matter of law.
1. The Static Conception of the NCAA
It has been "universally accepted" that Tarkanian
established that the NCAA is not a state actor subject to
constitutional limitations. 137 Tarkanian was decided in 1988,
133 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531
U.S. 288, 298 (2001) (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
134 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
135 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 295-96; see also Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("The Constitution constrains governmental action
'by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken.'" (quoting
Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1880))).
136 Brentwood I, 531 U.S. at 295-96.
137 Hearing, supra note 46, at 11 (statement of Prof. Gary Roberts); see also
Matthews v. NCAA, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Bloom v. NCAA,
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and, since that time, several facts have changed that make a
static conception of the NCAA's constitutional status particularly
troubling. First, as explained in great detail by Burlette Carter,
the NCAA has undergone significant restructuring in that time,
so that the association's governance structure, which was in
place and significant to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Tarkanian, is now gone. 138 Professor Carter makes a compelling
case for re-examining the NCAA's constitutional status based on
this dramatic restructuring, stating that "there now seems a very
good argument that state power has been delegated by public
institutions to the NCAA, at least in the case of Division I."139
Professor Carter also convincingly argues that state action could
be found on a theory of joint action.140
Also changed is our understanding of the student-
athlete experience and the interests that are at stake for those
who participate in NCAA-regulated sports.1 41  Numerous
commentators have asserted that the due process protections
offered to student-athletes are terribly inadequate given the
interests that are at stake. 142 Yet, the universal acceptance of
the NCAA as a private actor means that student-athletes have
very little meaningful legal recourse. This is because, since
Tarkanian, the constitutional status of the NCAA and the facts
underlying its operations have been taken by courts "as law
93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
138 Carter, supra note 50, at 27, 39. In the petitioner's brief in Tarkanian, it was
explained that "the general policies and all rules of the Association are voted on by
the member institutions at annual conventions. Each member is entitled to one vote
in matters voted on at Association meetings" to show that the influence of state
institutions is diminished because every institution, public or private, is entitled to
the same amount of authority over the rule-making process. Brief for the Petitioner
at 4, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (No. 87-1061). Burlette Carter
explains, however, that this is no longer the case.
139 Carter, supra note 50, at 85. Professor Carter argues that NCAA
restructuring will have its "most wide-ranging effect" on the state action issue,
because in Tarkanian, the Court relied on the fact that NCAA policies were
established by a one-member, one-vote system, so that for any given policy, "several
hundred" other institutions in addition to UNLV established it. Now, however, with
restructuring, the authority to set NCAA policy is controlled at the Divisional level,
so that, for instance, Division I members delegate authority to the Division I Board
of Directors and Management Council to set policy. Id. at 81-82.
140 Id. at 86.
141 See generally Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Economic Interests:
Contractual Dimensions, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 585 (1994); Sahl, supra note 61.
142 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 46, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus,
Member, House Subcomm. on the Constitution).
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itself."143 Accordingly, there have been no successful state action
challenges to the NCAA since Tarkanian was decided.
2. The Static Conception of the USOC
Similar to freezing the constitutional status of the NCAA,
the status of the USOC is widely assumed to be that of a private
actor, not subject to constitutional restraint due to the decisions
in San Francisco Arts & Athletics and DeFrantz. Aside from the
fact that such "freezing" is inappropriate according to the terms
of the state action doctrine itself, it is particularly problematic in
the case of the USOC because its "private" status was
determined in cases where the state action issue was litigated in
a limited way.
In DeFrantz, as discussed above, the case was litigated in the
sensitive aftermath of the former Soviet Union's invasion of
Afghanistan. The call to boycott the Olympic Games upon which
the claim in DeFrantz was made was a significant feature of the
Carter Administration's foreign policy response to the invasion.
The court's scrutiny of the involvement of the federal government
in the USOC's decision to boycott reveals that the court engaged
in a limited analysis of the issue. Noting that there was no
symbiotic relationship or close nexus between the federal
government and the USOC, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs, in essence, had to satisfy a higher burden to prove
state action because the case did not involve discrimination on
the basis of race.144 The Supreme Court, however, has never
imposed such a heightened requirement. Failing this version of
the state action inquiry, the district court in DeFrantz ruled
against the athletes, concluding that there was no state action.
The court tellingly noted that a finding of state action would
,necessarily involve the court in a "non-justiciable" area.
143 Carter, supra note 50, at 80.
144 DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181, 1194 (D.D.C. 1980).
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Like DeFrantz,145 San Francisco Arts & Athletics seems to be
a weak case from which to draw the conclusion that the USOC is
not a state actor as a matter of law. First, the state action issue
was not central to the parties' arguments. The case focused
primarily on statutory claims related to the use of the Olympic
trademark. Additionally, the case did not involve a dispute
related to Olympic Movement sports or an Olympic Movement
athlete. Moreover, the state action holding in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics is simply not broad enough to support the conclusion
that the USOC is not a state actor as a matter of law. The Court
held that the USOC is not a state actor under the "traditional
public function" theory because the USOC does not perform
functions that were traditionally the "exclusive prerogative" of
the government. This theory was SFAA's primary argument for
state action, as it was unable to show that the challenged action,
the denial of the use of the Olympic mark, was the product of
joint action, coercion, or significant encouragement by the United
States Government. 146 Indeed, SFAA could not show that the
action of denying the use of the mark had any nexus at all to the
federal government. Yet, despite the seemingly narrow ruling in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, it is generally taken as fact that
the USOC is not a state actor. As with the NCAA, there appears
to have been few if any constitutional challenges to the USOC
since the decisions in DeFrantz and San Francisco Arts &
Athletics.
145 Given the highly unique circumstances of DeFrantz, and the limited state
action analysis that resulted, DeFrantz would seem like a poor case upon which to
build a conclusion that the USOC is not a state actor as a matter of law. However,
this is just the effect that it had in San Francisco Arts & Athletics. An analysis of the
parties' briefs and the opinion in San Francisco Arts & Athletics shows the power of
the state action bootstrapping that has taken place. An important part of the
argument and holding that the USOC was not a state actor in San Francisco Arts &
Athletics was that it had been held not to be a state actor in DeFrantz. See S.F. Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 545 n.27 (1987) (noting that
"even the unique sequence of events in 1980 confirms that the USOC cannot
properly be considered a governmental agency" was quoted extensively from the
opinion in DeFrantz and explained that the District Court in that case found there
was no state action); see also Brief for Respondents at 45, S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 86-270) (citing DeFrantz for the
proposition that the USOC is not subject to constitutional restrictions).
146 See Koller, supra note 84, at 118-19.
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B. The State Action-Amateur Sport Cases Invite Increased State
Involvement in Amateur Athletics: The Case of the United
States Anti-Doping Agency
The "freezing" of the law's conception of the NCAA and the
USOC as private actors has had important consequences beyond
the fact that it has chilled constitutional litigation against the
NCAA and the USOC. The effect goes even further, by not only
deterring potential litigation, but also inviting increased state
involvement in amateur athletics without constitutional
constraints. 147 This effect can clearly be seen in the formation
and operation of the United States Anti-Doping Agency
("USADA").
Scholars have criticized the Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of the state action doctrine by noting that it comes
at a time of increased "privatization" of traditional government
programs. 148 Of particular concern is the government enlisting
private entities to implement government programs or provide
services on the government's behalf.1 49 Changes to Medicare and
Medicaid, welfare, and public education programs, among others,
are examples of increased "privatization."150 Privatization can
therefore take the form of contracting out traditionally-provided
government services, as was the case in Blum and Rendell-Baker,
or privatizing traditional public services such as utilities or
transportation. 151 The resulting exercises of government power
through ostensibly private hands are not subject to constitutional
scrutiny because of the current formulation of the state action
doctrine. 152 Thus, it has been argued that the "old tests" for state
147 This Article does not argue that increased state involvement in amateur
athletics is by itself improper or unwarranted. Instead, this Article makes the point
that it is state involvement without corresponding constitutional limitations that is
problematic.
148 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1183; Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 587-89 (2001);
Metzger, supra note 19, at 1457-60; Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57
ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 987 (2005).
149 William Brooks, The Privatization of the Civil Commitment Process and the
State Action Doctrine: Have the Mentally Ill Been Systematically Stripped of Their
Fourteenth Amendment Rights?, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2001); Metzger, supra note 19,
at 1370.
150 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1369, 1382.
151 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1183.
152 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1373.
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action are not keeping up with new governmental realities. 153
These new governmental realities go beyond the trend towards
"privatization." In the amateur sports context, the new
governmental reality is increasing state power in a traditionally
private area. This clearly can be seen in the formation of the
USADA, whose creation was through the efforts of the federal
government for the purpose of promoting federal anti-drug policy
goals.
In the past, prohibiting performance-enhancing drug use in
sports was not a government concern. Barrie Houlihan has
examined the "transition" of anti-doping efforts "from a private
matter to a public policy issue."154 While describing the United
States Government as traditionally "apathetic" on the issue of
doping, Houlihan states that the "United States Government,
which had for many years studiously avoided acknowledging the
issue of doping in sport," emerged in the late 1990's as a "leading
supporter... of a more rigorous anti-doping regime."'155  This
interest in anti-doping was a result of many factors, including
persistent reports of performance-enhancing drug use by elite
athletes and the fact that the government believed such use was
leading to an increase in performance-enhancing drug use,
including steroids, by young people.1 56 It was not just steroid use
by Olympic Movement athletes that concerned the government,
but use of such drugs by professional athletes as well. 57 Many
within the United States Government believed that the
government had a responsibility to undertake domestic and
international efforts to "strengthen anti-doping regimes."' 58
Building a domestic anti-doping "regime," however, required
153 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1186.
154 Barrie Houlihan, Building an International Regime to Combat Doping in
Sport, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 62,
62 (Roger Levermore & Adrian Budd eds., 2004).
155 Id. at 64, 72.
156 Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and
Athletic Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 106th Cong. 95 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on the Effects of
Performance Enhancing Drugs] (statement of Sen. John McCain, Member, S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
157 See generally Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports-The Medical and
Social Costs of Steroid Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. (1989).
158 Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, at
20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey).
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uniquely "state" resources. 159 Accordingly, many members of
Congress and the Executive Branch made it a policy objective to
fight doping in sports, resulting in the creation of the USADA.
160
The USADA became functional on October 1, 2000,161
designated by Congress as the United States' "official" anti-
doping agency. The USADA was created as a private, not-for-
profit corporation, which undertakes its duties pursuant to a
contract with the USOC to administer the United States' drug
testing programs.162 The USADA receives the vast majority of its
funding from the United States Government through the Office
of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"). 163 The USADA's
mission is to preserve "the well-being of Olympic sport, the
integrity of competition, and ensur[e] the health of athletes."164
In addition to its Olympic Movement duties, there have been a
variety of proposals in Congress that would involve the USADA
in drug testing programs for professional sports leagues and the
NCAA. 165
The need for state resources and the authority to combat
doping, coupled with the constitutional limits that state power
entails, provided a challenging situation for the government
officials who hoped to combat doping through the power of the
state. On the one hand, to be effective, officials believed an anti-
doping entity had to have United States Government status.
Initially, it was contemplated by the government officials
involved in forming the USADA that it would need to
be an actual government agency to be effective. 166 Officials
envisioned a "U.S. agency" with "certain governmental or quasi-
159 Houlihan, supra note 154, at 68.
160 Koller, supra note 84, at 103, 105.
161 U.S. Anti-Doping Agency History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history.
html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
162 Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win:
USADA Takes Over Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, 1 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 124, 127-28 (2003).
163 Koller, supra note 84, at 129.
164 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005), http://www.us
antidoping.org/files/active/who/annual-report_2004.pdf.
165 S. 1114, The Clean Sports Act of 2005, and S. 1334, The Professional Sports
Integrity and Accountability Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 39 (2005) (statement of Gary Bettman,
Commissioner, National Hockey League); see also id. at 65 (statement of Frank D.
Uryasz, President, The National Center for Drug Free Sport, Inc.).
166 See Koller, supra note 84, at 114-16.
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governmental powers," 167 or at least "some instrumentality of the
United States' status."168  It was asserted that governmental
status would improve the accountability of anti-doping efforts
and significantly enhance the credibility of the United States.1 69
On the other hand, however, there were concerns that the
United States would not be able to establish an effective anti-
doping agency because of constitutional rights of privacy and due
process.1 70 Indeed, at least some government officials hoped to
limit due process protections for accused athletes so that the
athlete could be removed from competition before having a
chance to defend him or herself.1 71  Some even questioned
whether there was a place for "fundamental notions of due
process" in the fight against doping. 172 This is the prevailing
view among anti-doping advocates-that, to be effective,
authorities must stay one step ahead of the cheaters.1 73 One of
the ways doping authorities stay "one step ahead" is through the
administration of an anti-doping regime, the World Anti-Doping
Code, which was developed through the World Anti-Doping
Agency with significant input and influence from the United
States.1 74 Under these regulations, doping is a strict liability
offense, and authorities need only prove their claim based on the
"comfortable satisfaction" of regulators, not "beyond a reasonable
doubt."1 75 Using this standard, the USADA announced that it
had eliminated the requirement that an athlete actually fail a
167 Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, at
20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey).
168 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, PROCEEDINGS: FIRST
MEETING OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS 83 (2000)
[hereinafter WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS].
169 Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156, at
20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey).
170 See WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, supra note 168, at
7 (statement of Barry R. McCaffrey).
171 See id. at 35 (open discussion response of Mickey Ibarra).
172 Id. at 56 (remarks of Scott Blackmun).
173 See Laura S. Stewart, Comment, Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency
Gone Too Far? Analyzing the Shift from 'Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' to Comfortable
Satisfaction, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 207, 227 (2006); see also Amy Shipley, A
Wider Front in Doping Battle: Law Enforcement Takes the Lead in Sports Probes,
WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2007, at A01 ("In an environment in which the athletes who
use illegal performance-enhancing substances seem routinely to be at least one step
ahead of drug testers, efforts are underway to strengthen the relationship between
sports bodies and law enforcement officials.").
174 Koller, supra note 84, at 100, 103-04.
175 Stewart, supra note 173, at 225.
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drug test before being sanctioned. Instead, the USADA asserted
that it can sanction an athlete based on a "non-analytical
positive," which is circumstantial evidence of doping "to the
comfortable satisfaction" of regulators. 176 Critics have argued
that this level of proof for a doping violation has the possibility of
being "unreliable and unfair,"177 especially coupled with the stiff
penalties and difficult procedural hurdles for accused athletes.
Athletes have few legal options, outside of arbitration, if they
believe the process was unfair. 178 Such a system, if administered
by the state, could trigger constitutional privacy and due process
protections.
This fact is not lost on those both within and outside of the
government who wish to fight doping in sports. Therefore,
instead of simply creating a government agency to fight doping,
members of Congress and the ONDCP worked to establish an
entity that would not be subject to constitutional limitations.
Congress and the ONDCP did this by using their influence over
the USOC, which had been declared by the Supreme Court in
San Francisco Arts & Athletics to be a private entity, to direct it
to establish the USADA. 179 Thus, officially, the USADA states it
was created by the USOC.180 However, the impetus for and effort
to create the USADA was from the ONDCP and Congress, both of
which provided the blueprint and funding for what the USADA
became.181
Since its formation, members of Congress and the Executive
Branch have been significantly involved in key areas of the
USADA's operation. For instance, in the months leading up to
the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, the government used its
subpoena power to aid a USADA investigation and prevent
certain athletes from competing in the Games.18 2 Specifically,
176 Koller, supra note 174, at 93, 111. The USADA has in fact sanctioned several
athletes using the "non-analytical positive" standard. Id. at 93.
177 James A.R. Nafziger, Circumstantial Evidence of Doping. BALCO and
Beyond, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 45, 47 (2005).
178 See Stewart, supra note 173, at 242.
179 See Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156,
at 20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey); see also WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE
ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, supra note 168, at 15 (remarks of Frank Shorter).
180 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2002), http://www.
usantidoping.org/files/active/who/annual-report_2001.pdf.
181 See Hearing on the Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs, supra note 156,
at 20 (statement of Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey).
182 See Owen Slot, United States Risks Losing Race Against Time to Keep Athens
[Vol. 82:183
FROZEN IN TIME
government officials were concerned that track and field athletes
implicated in the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative ("BALCO")
scandal might compete in Athens. Yet without the information
from the BALCO grand jury investigation, USADA was unable to
bring doping cases against those who may have used previously-
undetectable performance-enhancing drugs. Accordingly, to
prevent any BALCO-tainted athletes from going to Athens, a
Senate Committee subpoenaed documents from the Department
of Justice that were part of the ongoing BALCO investigation.
1 8 3
The Senate, in what was termed an "unprecedented action"
184
subsequently turned the material over to USADA.
18 5
The BALCO scandal was not an isolated incident. In fact,
the USADA regularly works with the government to develop
evidence and pursue sanctions against athletes. For instance,
the USADA recently has worked with federal agents as part of a
multi-state investigation and bust of an operation that sold
steroids and other performance-enhancing drugs through the
internet, and they apparently are working with the government
on several other investigations.1 8 6 It is contemplated that, just as
it did with the BALCO scandal, the government will provide any
evidence of purchases by Olympic Movement athletes so that the
USADA can take action to sanction them.18 7 This collaboration
has yielded results that the USADA simply could not achieve on
its own.188 In addition, in 2004, the United States Attorney
involved in the BALCO case gave permission to one of the
investigators in the case to testify at hearings in which USADA
was seeking to ban from competition athletes who had never
failed a drug test. The United States Attorney allowed the
Clean, U.K. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at 46.
183 Press Release, Sen. John McCain, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., Committee to Subpoena DOJ Documents Relating to Banned
Substance Use in Olympics (Apr. 8, 2004).
184 S. 529: To Authorize Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong.
(2005) (opening statement of Ted Stevens, Chairman, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency).
185 S. Res. 355, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted).
186 See Shipley, supra note 173, at A01.
187 See id.
188 See id. (explaining that doping authorities do not have reliable tests for
agents such as human growth hormone and other performance-enhancing agents so
that they must rely on evidence developed from government investigations). "'If you
look at the really big busts, the really big advances, the majority have been with the
assistance of other government agencies . . . .' Id. (quoting WADA Director, Gen.
David Howman).
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investigator to use at the hearings original documents from the
investigation so that their authenticity could not be challenged,
and so that the USADA could win its case. The United States
Attorney acknowledged that such a move was "unique" because
the criminal investigation was still ongoing, but that partnering
with the USADA was part of an effort to "help them in their
mission."18 9 Moreover, the blurred line between the government
and the USADA is illustrated by the fact that when athletes who
test positive for use of a banned substance agree to assist the
government in steroid-related investigations, the USADA offers
them a lesser penalty.1 90 As one anti-doping official stated, the
government's assistance in USADA's operations has caused a
"revolution" in the anti-doping movement, as "sports authorities
have no power to do anything and government has the power to
do all. That's what it takes."1 91
It is this "difference" that is made by the government using
its tools against individuals that is supposed to trigger
constitutional protections. Yet, while nothing should preclude a
finding of state action against the USADA, such a finding, under
current state action-amateur sports jurisprudence, is not
likely. 192 The USADA's position is that, like the USOC, it is a
"private" actor. Given the static conception of both the USOC
and the NCAA as "private" actors, the state action precedent is
particularly powerful. It not only arguably protects USADA's
"private" status, it protects the government's ability to fight
doping in the manner it deems most effective: using the power
and status of the state to combat doping, while avoiding the
unpleasant side-effects of constitutional litigation. Thus, while
the state action-sport cases do limit the reach of "federal judicial
power," according to one of the asserted goals of the state action
doctrine, it certainly does not limit the reach of government
189 Id. (quoting Matt Parrella, an assistant U.S. attorney assigned to the
BALCO case).
190 Cf. Amy Shipley, Gatlin Will Claim Sabotage in Defense of Doping Charges,
WASH. POST, July 30, 2007, at EO1.
191 Shipley, supra note 173, at A01 (noting that government "tools" make the
difference in the anti-doping effort). "'When I look at the 23 years of work before
Balco and what we were able to do-yeah, we would grind out positives and
occasionally have a big hit-but when the government... decides to go after it and
comes in with their tools. . . [t]hey (wiretap), they pull out e-mails; I was amazed.'"
Id. (quoting Don Catlin, Director of UCLA's Olympic Analytical Laboratory).
192 See Koller, supra note 84, at 116.
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power exercised through the executive and legislative branches.
This fact has a cost, as explained below, in that it undermines
the legitimacy of our most important amateur sports
organizations.
C. The "Frozen" Status of the NCAA and USOC Undermines
Their Legitimacy
The conclusion that the NCAA and the USOC were private
actors in San Francisco Arts & Athletics and Tarkanian, and the
static conception of these entities that has followed, directly
collides with the perception that the USOC and NCAA regulate
athletes through and with the power of the state. This
perception undermines the legitimacy of these organizations in a
way that allowing constitutional litigation against them to go
forward would not.
1. Amateur Athletic Regulation Is Perceived to Be Unfair
Amateur sport is a tempting target for government
influence, because of its high profile nature, appeals to
nationalism, and commercial importance. As a result, the NCAA,
USOC, and now the USADA are far from being simply "private,"
but instead operate with significant government presence and
influence. This dissonance between the notion that the USOC
and the NCAA are private as a matter of law and the perceived
reality of the state's presence in their activities undermines the
legitimacy of their regulation 193 because the USOC and the
NCAA, and now the USADA, are perceived to have an unfair
advantage over the athletes and others they regulate-the
backing of the government.
To some extent, the legitimacy problems brought on by the
state action-amateur sports cases begin with the reasoning of the
decisions themselves, which emphasize a formalistic analysis of
the structure of the NCAA and the USOC, and not the practical
193 It could be argued that Brentwood I went a long way to curing some of the
legitimacy problems created by the state action-amateur sport cases, by holding the
obviously state-influenced TSSAA to constitutional standards. See Brentwood Acad.
v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001).
However, in that case, the Court also reaffirmed the conclusion in Tarkanian. See id.
at 297-98. Moreover, in Brentwood II, one Justice said the state action ruling was
wrong and should be over-turned. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood I1), 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2499 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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realities of how these entities operate. 194  For instance, of
significance to the Court in Tarkanian was the fact that UNLV
could simply have refused to sanction Tarkanian according to the
NCAA's demands and withdrawn from the NCAA. Although the
dissent pointed out that such a reason was not legally sufficient
to defeat a finding of state action,' 95 the reasoning itself was not
factually sound in terms of the NCAA's virtual monopoly over
inter-collegiate athletic competition. Pulling out of the NCAA
would essentially have cost the university its athletic programs
and millions of dollars of lost television and marketing revenue,
something no university would risk.
Moreover, the Court's emphasis on the formal structure of
UNLV's relationship with the NCAA ignored the practical
realities of the challenged action. The facts in Tarkanian
indicated that public universities had a great deal to do with the
actions taken against Coach Tarkanian. The Committee on
Infractions and the NCAA Council were responsible for the
sanctions. Four out of five members of the Committee on
Infractions were representatives of public universities, 196 and
eleven out of sixteen members of the NCAA Council were
representatives from public universities. By turning a blind eye
to these facts, the Supreme Court contributed to what one
commentator has explained is "a long-held perception of those
involved in intercollegiate athletics ... that the NCAA has
exercised unfettered discretion in regulating college sports." 197
Moreover, as stated during a 2004 hearing on Due Process and
the NCAA, "Merited or not, the NCAA has at least the perception
of a fairness problem.' 98
Likewise, the Court's steadfast refusal, in San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, to acknowledge the unique importance of the
USOC to the federal government, and its unique status within
the governmental orbit was, again, a refusal to acknowledge
194 Such a "disconnect" between the state action doctrine and political and social
realities is, as some critics have argued, a problem with the doctrine itself. As
Charles Black asserted, the doctrine fails to account for "the wonderfully variegated
ways in which the Briarean state can put its hundred hands on life." Black, supra
note 38, at 89.
195 NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 202-03 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
196 Id. at 185 (majority opinion).
197 Arslanian, supra note 49, at 355.
198 Hearing, supra note 46, at 2 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman,
House Subcomm. on the Constitution).
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commonly accepted facts and perceptions. The effect of this, as
discussed above, is that the USADA is likely to enjoy the same
deference as the USOC and escape constitutional scrutiny. This
is particularly troubling, as the USADA, perhaps even more than
the USOC, is clearly perceived to be an instrument of the United
States Government. In addition to its designation as the United
States' "official" anti-doping agency, the USADA, in many cases,
carries the endorsement of the United States Government.
199
Moreover, the "imprimatur" of the federal government on
USADA's actions is apparent to the athletes who are tested and
sanctioned by USADA. For instance, when the BALCO scandal
was unfolding, many athletes were acutely aware of Congress's
indispensable assistance with USADA's investigation of athletes
for doping violations. 200
Finally, the perception of unfairness is enhanced because the
state action doctrine as applied to amateur sports has not
"preserve[d] state sovereignty" 20 1 to regulate private behavior by
limiting the reach of federal power. In the case of the NCAA, as
explained above, numerous states reacted to the Tarkanian
decision by attempting to provide enhanced due process
protections for institutions and individuals, including student-
athletes, who are targeted by NCAA proceedings. 20 2 The NCAA
responded to these initiatives by suing for declaratory and
injunctive relief on the grounds that the state statutes violated
the Commerce Clause.20 3 This effort was successful, and state
statutes attempting to require the NCAA to provide targeted
199 Indeed, this endorsement is clear to the media, which frequently reports on
the USADA as if it were an instrumentality of the United States Government. See
Sally Jenkins, Due Process? Not for Track Stars, WASH. POST, June 26, 2004, at DOI
('You get an uneasy feeling from watching USADA's bumbling zealots. You get the
feeling they'd waive the U.S. Constitution if they could-which is a pretty unsettling
thing to feel about an organization that is funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars and a
grant from the White House."); see also Luis Fernando Llosa & L. Jon Wertheim,
Inside the Steroid Sting, SI.cOM, Mar. 6, 2007, http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/2007/more/03/06/rx.troubleO3l2/index.html (listing the USADA among the
"law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies" involved in a recent bust of individuals
involved in distributing performance-enhancing substances).
200 See Koller, supra note 84, at 132 (observing that track and field athletes
Marion Jones and Kelli White had noted Congress's intense interest in the USADA's
anti-doping efforts, and even expressed their belief that Congress appeared to be
singling out track and field and ignoring doping in other sports).
201 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 536.
202 See Kitchin, supra note 51, at 76.
203 See id. at 76-77.
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individuals with certain due process protections were either
struck down or rendered meaningless, leaving states with no
options for regulating such conduct. 204 For instance, in NCAA v.
Miller, the court held that the NCAA's need for uniformity in its
enforcement procedures overrode states' interests in ensuring
due process for its citizens.20 5 Similarly, state law that might
apply to actions taken against Olympic Movement athletes is
pre-empted by the Amateur Sports Act. 206
2. Amateur Athletic Regulation Is Perceived to Be Racist
Critics of the state action doctrine have pointed out that
applying the state action requirement to protect individual
autonomy and freedom is "to look at only one side of the
equation."20 7  This equation is a complex one in the area of
amateur sports, because sports are entwined with and reflective
of power relationships in society.208 The law applied to sports is
necessarily so entwined as well, especially with respect to race
and sports. In this way, what may be most troubling about the
application of the state action doctrine to amateur sports is that
the deference shown to organizations such as the NCAA and the
USOC is necessarily married with a doctrine that originated in
racism. 209
The Civil Rights Cases and the resulting state action
requirement, which limited the Fourteenth Amendment to cases
of active discrimination by the state, were the product of the 1877
Compromise, which ended Reconstruction 210 and reflected the
entrenched racism that has troubled this country since its
204 See NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1993); NCAA v. Roberts, No.
TCA 94-40413-WS, 1994 WL 750585, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 1994).
205 Miller, 10 F.3d at 639-40.
206 See Slaney v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 244 F.3d 580, 596 (7th Cir. 2001).
207 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 537. "R]nder the state action doctrine, the
rights of the private violator always are favored over the rights of the victims.
Therefore, state action enhances freedom only if it is believed that the liberty to
violate the Constitution always is more important than the individual rights that
are infringed." Id. "[The state action] doctrine has seldom been used to shelter
citizens from coercive federal or judicial power. More often, it has been employed to
protect the autonomy of business enterprises against the claims of consumers,
minorities, and other relatively powerless citizens." Brest, supra note 14, at 1330.
208 See JAY COAKLEY, SPORT IN SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 87-93
(8th ed. 2004).
209 See Black, supra note 38, at 70; Silard, supra note 42, at 855; Ugarte, supra
note 8, at 482.
210 Silard, supra note 42, at 855.
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founding.211  Since that time, with some e)tceptions, 212 the
doctrine has been invoked with the result being that "private"
forms of racism were permitted to stand.213 As Charles Black
noted in the late 1960s: "[T]he 'state action' concept ... has just
one practical function; if and where it works, it immunizes racist
practices from constitutional control." 214  This fact cannot be
ignored in the discussion of the state action doctrine as applied to
amateur sports, because a significant number of athletes affected
by NCAA, USOC and now USADA actions are African-American.
Critics of amateur sports regulation have made a compelling
case that racism in amateur sports persists, despite the "illusion
of equality."215 For instance, Professor Timothy Davis and others
explain that one of the symptoms of racism in college sports is
that while a substantial number of African-American student-
athletes participate in college revenue-producing sports, there
are a limited number of African-Americans holding decision-
making positions within the NCAA and at the university level.216
Additionally, many argue that "another consequence of
unconscious racism [in college sports] is the disparate impact of
NCAA rules and regulations on African-American student
athletes."21 7 The NCAA's initial eligibility standards, which set
the benchmarks of academic achievement that must be met for a
prospective student-athlete to be eligible for a college athletic
scholarship, is one example that has received a great deal of
scholarly attention. 218 Critics have pointed to other rules as well,
such as those limiting a coach's contact with current student-
athletes and regulations limiting the amount of money student-
211 Ugarte, supra note 8, at 507.
212 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 717 (1961)
(holding that a restaurant owner's exclusion of customers based on race could, in
certain circumstances, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948) (holding that the enforcement of a
restrictive covenant that would limit occupancy of real property based upon race is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Consitution).
213 See Silard, supra note 42, at 855; Ugarte, supra note 8, at 481. See generally
Black, supra note 38 (discussing the "private" forms of racism permitted under the
state action doctrine).
214 Black, supra note 38, at 90.
215 Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in
College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 640-41 (1995).
216 Id. at 657.
217 Id. at 660; see also KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE
AND SPORTS IN AMERICA 110 (1996).
218 See, e.g., SHROPSHIRE, supra note 217, at 103-27.
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athletes can earn. 219 On that issue, one member of Congress
pointed out that "most of these students are very poor and it is
very hard for them to even pay for their cost of living. Yet the
NCAA has really led the fight against a lot of things for athletes,
including compensating them at least for their living
expenses." 220  Indeed, some commentators have suggested that
addressing issues of exploitation in amateur sports is a "new
frontier" for the civil.rights movement. 221 Because of the current
application of the state action doctrine to amateur sports,
however, constitutional Equal Protection and Due Process
challenges to the NCAA are considered impossible. 222
Similarly, actions taken by the USADA-and recognized by
the USOC-arguably have a disproportionate impact on African-
American athletes, and yet are likely not subject to constitutional
challenge. For instance, track and field, a sport that is
traditionally represented by a significant number of African-
American athletes, especially sprinters, is by far the most tested
sport by the USADA.223 Indeed, all of the athletes sanctioned by
the USADA as a result of the Senate providing secret grand jury
documents to the USADA were African-American. This
emphasis on track and field, with the resulting USADA
sanctions, has created a perception that African-American
athletes are cheaters. 224 This is particularly troubling because
219 Davis, supra note 215, at 660-61 ("Many believe that these rules as a whole
operate to produce disproportionate injury to African-American student-athletes and
their communities."); see also Timothy Davis, African-American Student Athletes:
Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 199-200
(1995) (arguing that the "dissonance" between the economic and social realities that
many African-American student-athletes face and the NCAA rules undermines the
legitimacy of the NCAA's regulatory scheme).
220 Hearing, supra note 46, at 14 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Member,
House Subcomm. on the Constitution).
221 Leroy D. Clark, New Directions for the Civil Rights Movement: College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 HOW. L.J. 259, 267 (1993).
222 Id. at 281 (noting that the NCAA is "probably immune to attack" because of
Tarkanian).
223 U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2007), http://www.us
antidoping.org/files/active/who/annual report 2006.pdf (stating that the USADA
performed 1,755 drug tests on track and field athletes, by far the largest number for
any sport).
224 Gregory Moore, Cheaters Like Gatlin, Others Make Track a Modern Day
Sodom, BLACK ATHLETE, Aug. 27, 2006, http://www.blackathlete.net/artman2/
publishTrack.ampField_36/CheatersLikeGatlinOthersMakeTrack A Modern
Da_2267.shtml.
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such actions have the weight of the state behind them due to the
USADA's unique relationship with Congress and the ONDCP.
The significant consequences outlined above should not be
ignored. Accordingly, as explained below, the most effective
solution might not be preventing constitutional litigation based
on the state action doctrine, but rather acknowledging the state
power at work in amateur athletics, permitting the complete
litigation of the interests of the athletes and the process given.
In this way, the law could be "settled" more convincingly for both
athletes and the organizations that regulate them, so that the
concerns discussed above can fully be heard.
III. A BETTER APPROACH-ALLOW CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS TO
PROCEED ON THE MERITS
The argument made by this Article, that the static
conception of the state action doctrine as applied to amateur
sports has important consequences, begs the question of whether
such consequences are necessary or can be avoided through a
different, better approach. I argue that they can, by simply
allowing constitutional litigation against the NCAA, USOC, and
now the USADA, to go forward. Doing so is not unfair, 225 and it
will allow important questions of what interests an amateur
athlete possesses, and to what process an individual affected by
NCAA, USOC, or USADA action is entitled, to be heard.
Moreover, the government will have less of an incentive to
exercise its unchecked authority and influence through amateur
athletic institutions. Allowing constitutional litigation to go
forward will also go a long way toward eliminating the
perception, if not the reality, that protecting organizations such
as the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA from constitutional
litigation is facilitating the exploitation of athletes.
A. Applying the State Action Doctrine to Amateur Sports
Organizations Is Not Unfair
The Supreme Court consistently has explained that the
central consideration in determining whether the Constitution
should be applied to ostensibly private entities is whether it is
"fair" to do so. 226 In the case of the amateur sports organizations
225 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
226 Id. at 923 (stating that the challenged action must be "fairly attributable to
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discussed here, the NCAA, the USOC, and now the USADA, can
be fairly held to constitutional standards because they are not
simply a typical private individual or entity that conducts its
affairs in the absence of direct influence from the state. In
addition, it is fair to hold these entities to constitutional
standards because there are no compelling "countervailing
reasons" not to.
Applying the Constitution to the NCAA, the USOC, or the
USADA, and breaking the static conception of these entities as
private as a matter of law, would not be akin to applying
constitutional restrictions to the "homeowner's choice of his
guests." 227 All three were created and are sustained by the direct
involvement and influence of the state. In the case of the NCAA,
the entity is substantially controlled and funded by public
universities. The USOC, while not predominantly funded by the
federal government, 228 was created by and takes substantial
direction from it. The USADA is substantially funded and
influenced by the federal government, enforcing policies that the
United States Government had a hand in creating. Moreover, to
better achieve the federal government's goals, the USADA was
established in such a way to avoid constitutional protections for
the athletes that it sanctions. Accordingly, the argument that
these entities have a significant public character does not simply
derive from positivist notions that all power and authority can be
traced to the state, 229 or that the state has an affirmative
obligation to act to protect athletes and others from the actions of
"private" sports regulators.230  The state is intervening in
amateur sports regulation through its control of the NCAA, the
USOC, and the USADA. This is, then, a matter of the exercise of
affirmative state power, in the "full and complete sense of the
phrase"231 and not a matter of state abstention.23 2 Additionally,
the State").
227 Silard, supra note 42, at 870-71.
228 Although it is not directly funded by the federal government, as is USADA,
the USOC derives the majority of its revenue from the exclusive right to license the
Olympic trademark granted by Congress in the Amateur Sports Act.
229 Chemerinsky, supra note 7, at 520-21.
230 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193
(1989) (rejecting the petitioner's argument that the state violated his Due Process
rights by failing to intervene to protect him).
231 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
232 Id. "[Niothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by
224 [Vol. 82:183
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it is also not unfair to hold these entities to constitutional
limitations because there is no important, "countervailing
reason"233 against finding state action. The Supreme Court has
explained that such a countervailing reason can support the
conclusion of no state action if there are important policy reasons
for the entity or individual at issue to remain "private."234 Such a
reason has never been articulated in the state action-amateur
sport cases. 235
In the absence of a clear countervailing reason to reject a
finding of state action, the decisions are left to rest simply on the
outdated, static notion that amateur sports are a purely private
endeavor. This reflects what has been called "Lochner-like
thinking,"236 where the state had little involvement in areas such
as health, education, and general welfare, and of course, sports.
Yet because of the increased presence of the state in amateur
athletics, the state action-amateur sport cases have the effect of
granting significant deference to the state, because the courts
are allowing the government, in effect, to operate unfettered in
the regulation of amateur athletics. This deference amounts to
leaving issues regarding the state's involvement in amateur
sports to what is essentially a non-justiciable gray area, and it
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to
act... it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty or
property.... DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
233 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n (Brentwood 1), 531
U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001).
From the range of circumstances that could point toward the State behind
an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition across
the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely
sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing
activity to the government.
Id.
234 The Supreme Court found that there was a countervailing reason against
finding state action in a case involving a challenge to the actions of a public
defender. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). The Supreme Court held
that the public defender was not an agent of the state, despite being an employee of
the state, because the attorney's function in that role is to be an adversary of the
state, not working in concert with it. Id. at 320.
235 It is hard to imagine that a strong case could be made that there are
important countervailing reasons to reject a finding of state action in the amateur
sports context. Unlike the preservation of the attorney-client relationship and
maintenance of the adversarial system, there is not a valid, independent reason why
the state could not be responsible for amateur athletics regulation.
236 Barak-Erez, supra note 114, at 1186.
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invites increasing involvement in areas that implicate significant
constitutional concerns.
Finally, continuing to hold on to static, outdated notions that
amateur sports organizations such as the USOC and the NCAA
are private unfairly grants these organizations special treatment.
Indeed, the common theme in the arguments against
applying constitutional due process standards to amateur sports
organizations is that doing so would jeopardize the ability of the
NCAA and USOC-and now the USADA-to regulate sports
effectively. This argument consists of part threat and part plea
for special treatment, and courts and Congress by and large give
it great weight. The first component of the argument is that
constitutional protections for athletes would be expensive and
that constitutional lawsuits and the cost of litigation would make
it impossible for the entities that regulate athletics to do their
jobs. 237 Because athletics at all levels is such a vital part of
American society, and the "amateur ideal" so revered, courts and
Congress are urged to give amateur sports organizations room to
regulate without these enormous costs.
The second component of the deference argument is that
amateur sports organizations are in a unique position, fighting
an uphill battle to regulate and preserve the amateur ideal
against extraordinary incentives to cheat. 238 Indeed, both the
NCAA and the USADA make such arguments and thereby justify
giving less due process protection because of the unique needs of
regulating in such a difficult environment. Giving the NCAA,
USOC, and potentially the USADA deference in this regard
really then gives deference to the state to protect the "amateur
ideal" and fight cheating in amateur athletics without
constitutional restriction.
237 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 17 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School); Brief for
Colorado High School Activities Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
3-5, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad. (Brentwood 11), 127 S.
Ct. 2489 (2007) (No. 06-427), 2006 WL 3495621, at *3-4; Brief for National
Federation of State High School Ass'ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad.
(Brentwood 11), 127 S. Ct. 2489 (2007) (No. 06-427), 2006 WL 3495622, at *6-7.
238 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 12 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School); Richard W.
Pound, Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Sport: Response by the International Sports
Community, 55 CANADIAN INST. OF INT'L AFFAIRS: INT'L J. 485, 488 (2000).
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This alone, however, fails to provide a compelling reason to
ignore the state power present in amateur athletics and the
unfairness to athletes and others that results by effectively
cutting off any meaningful legal recourse against the entities
that regulate amateur sports. Additionally, it also fails to
explain how protecting the "amateur ideal" and preventing
cheating cannot be done by respecting fundamental notions of
privacy and due process. For these reasons, it can be argued that
the application of the state action doctrine to the NCAA, the
USOC, or the USADA would not unduly extend the reach of the
state action doctrine, but would instead serve to limit judicial
deference to amateur sports organizations. Limiting this
deference is hardly unfair, because deference, by its very nature,
is not something that an entity is entitled to.
B. Applying the State Action Doctrine to Amateur Sports
Organizations Will Not Impede Their Ability to Regulate
Athletics
A second reason to allow constitutional litigation to go
forward against the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA is that it
will not, contrary to what these organizations suggest, impede
their ability to effectively regulate amateur athletics. Indeed, it
might even enhance it, by acknowledging the state power that is
present in the regulation of amateur athletics, thereby shifting
the debate to whether the amateur athlete or other aggrieved
individual has a sufficient interest at stake and whether this
interest was adequately protected. It will also minimize the
perception that in trying to uphold the "amateur ideal" and
prevent cheating in amateur athletics, the NCAA, the USOC,
and the USADA, with a mantle of state authority, cheat
themselves.
As an initial matter, the NCAA and the USOC are no
strangers to government influence in their operations. The
NCAA was subject to constitutional standards for years before
the Tarkanian ruling, seemingly without disastrous
consequences. In addition, Congress historically has taken a
special interest in their activities. For instance, Congress has
held numerous hearings on the conduct of the USOC.239 Most
239 See Olympic Family-Functional or Dysfunctional?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the
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recently, Congress held hearings and proposed reforms related to
the USOC's governance structure after allegations of ethical
improprieties. 240 During those hearings, the acting president of
the USOC demonstrated the USOC's dependence on and
responsiveness to Congress, stating that "[a]ll of this comes down
to the question of just what Congress, to whom we are ultimately
accountable, wants the USOC to do." 241 Moreover, as described
above, it was the pressure of Congress and the President that
caused the USOC to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games. It was
also the pressure brought by Congress, and specifically
individual senators, which ultimately led the USOC to
discontinue its anti-doping program and create the USADA.
Similarly, the NCAA has been called before Congress several
times to answer for what appears to be unfair enforcement
procedures and harsh treatment of student-athletes. 242  This
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Legislative Efforts to Reform the U.S. Olympic
Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003); Does the
U.S. Olympic Committee's Organizational Structure Impede Its Mission?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003); United States Olympic
Committee ("USOC") Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003); State of the United States Olympic
Committee ("USOC'): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003); Investigation of the Olympic Scandal: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Cong. (1999);
Oversight of Activities of the Olympic Committee. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong.
(1994).
240 See Does the U.S. Olympic Committee's Organizational Structure Impede Its
Mission?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003).
241 Id. at 26 (statement of William C. Martin, Acting President, United States
Olympic Committee).
242 See Hearing, supra note 46; Supporting Our Intercollegiate Student-Athletes:
Proposed NCAA Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004);
College Recruiting: Are Student-Athletes Being Protected?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004); Challenges Facing Amateur Athletics:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002); Amateur Sports Integrity
Act: Hearing on S. 718 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001); Student Athlete Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.
3575 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000); Stipends for Student
Athletes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and
Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. (1994);
Intercollegiate Sports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer
FROZEN IN TIME
perception fuels congressional inquiries into whether the process
given to student-athletes and others affected by its actions is
sufficient. These congressional inquiries indicate that the NCAA
is in many ways treated as if it were a state actor. This point
was driven home in a 2004 hearing on "Due Process and the
NCAA," where one member of the Sub-Committee on the
Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee pointed out that
it was not at all clear that the procedures of the NCAA fall within
the committee's jurisdiction, stating that "due process does fall
under the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee, but that is generally
due process by the United States Government, not due process by
a private organization, such as the NCAA." 243  Because the
NCAA still faces pressure to provide better due process
protections for student-athletes and others targeted by their
enforcement proceedings, some commentators have called
Tarkanian a "pyrrhic" victory.244 Thus, with respect to the
NCAA, the USOC, and now the USADA, it appears that there is
not a practice of undiluted liberty or autonomy that the state
action-amateur sport cases have enhanced.
In addition, all of these entities give their athletes some
measure of due process when they take actions against them.
These due process protections might pass constitutional muster,
or a court could find, despite the persuasive arguments to the
contrary, that an amateur athlete does not have a property
interest at stake. Because the state action decision does not
settle constitutional litigation, but only gets it to the merits,
there is then plenty of room for courts to show deference to
amateur sports organizations in a case-by-case analysis of
whether athletes have a protected property interest sufficient to
trigger due process protections, for instance, or a sufficient
expectation of privacy to support a Fourth Amendment claim.
If this were the case, it would not mean that constitutional
litigation was inefficient or wasteful. Allowing athletes to have
their day in court would have the significant benefit of
eliminating the perception that amateur sports organizations
Protection, and Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong. (1993); Hearings on the Role of Athletics in College Life: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor,
101st Cong. (1989).
243 Hearing, supra note 46, at 3 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler, Member,
Comm. on the Judiciary).
244 Verkuil, supra note 148, at 973.
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such as the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA have an unfair
advantage and that such advantage results in the exploitation of
athletes. Moreover, it would develop a body of case law that
would credibly settle issues relating to athletes' due process
rights, more than could be done by simply "freezing" outdated
and inaccurate conceptions of the USOC and the NCAA.
Allowing constitutional litigation to go forward against the
NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA would also go a long way
toward eliminating the damaging disconnect between application
of the state action doctrine and the reality of who the state action
doctrine is disempowering. This would enhance the legitimacy of
these organizations more than the litigation itself would hinder
their efficiency.
C. Individuals Affected by Amateur Sports Regulation Have
Little Legal or Legislative Recourse
A final reason to allow constitutional litigation to go forward
is that the only hope for a meaningful legal option is through
federal constitutional litigation. As explained above, states have
little or no options to protect amateur athletes and others from
perceived abuses by the NCAA, the USOC, and the USADA.
Moreover, a federal statutory remedy is not likely. First,
student-athletes cannot possibly match the resources of the
NCAA in terms of lobbying. Burlette Carter notes that one of the
NCAA's roles for its members is as "lobbyist and litigation
strategist" and one of its projects was to work to defeat the
various state initiatives that sprung up after Tarkanian to give
greater due process in its enforcement proceedings. 245 The NCAA
also uses litigation to challenge undesirable legislation. 246
Accordingly, while it is true that individual Congressmen have
taken up issues regarding the NCAA's due process protections in
certain cases, a broader interest in protecting athletes' rights has
yet to, and likely will not, develop in Congress. 247
245 Carter, supra note 50, at 24-25.
246 Id. at 25.
247 See Hearing, supra note 46, at 16 (statement of Gary R. Roberts, Deputy
Dean and Director of the Sports Law Program, Tulane Law School) (noting that
reform of college athletics is "politically unrealistic" because such reform would be
counter to the "millions of fans who... 'consume' college athletics as an
entertainment product").
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Similarly, the access and resources of the USOC and now the
USADA are no match for the typical athlete. Because of their
close relationship with the federal government through Congress,
and, for the USADA, and the ONDCP as well, it is not likely that
a movement among athletes for greater due process protections
would get very far. Especially on the issue of fighting
performance-enhancing drug use, government officials seem not
at all concerned about due process protections. In fact, it appears
that at least some in Congress and the Executive Branch fear
that due process protections would undermine initiatives to
achieve the government goal of combating drug use in sports.
In contrast to the extraordinary access and resources the
NCAA, USOC, and USADA enjoy, the athletes they regulate are
more akin to participants in an entitlement program. As
Metzger explains, the "private" entities that administer
government programs have a significant amount of control over
the participants. She states:
[T]his control is enhanced when private entities have a
monopoly or quasi-monopoly over access to government-
subsidized services or broad powers over how government
institutions operate. Another factor enhancing private power
over participants is that privatization frequently occurs in
contexts marked by relations of dependence .... 248
Similarly, the ostensibly private entities that regulate
amateur athletics have an enormous degree of power over
athletes. Athletes cannot compete, whether in collegiate or
Olympic Movement sports, without meeting the eligibility
criteria of the relevant organization-the NCAA, the USOC, or
the USADA. The dependence of the amateur athlete on the
entity that regulates his or her sport is not simply because he or
she must meet the entity's criteria in order to compete.
Typically, amateur athletes have few resources 249 and are
dependent on the entity to fund their educations, training, and
living expenses. In the case of NCAA student-athletes, it has
been said that "most of these students are very poor."2
50
248 Metzger, supra note 19, at 1396.
249 See Sahl, supra note 61, at 641-42 (noting that some authorities consider
student-athletes a "'vulnerable' class").
250 Hearing, supra note 46, at 5 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Member,
House Subcomm. on the Constitution).
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Additionally, political accountability as a check on the abuse
of state power through amateur sports organizations is not a
viable option. Amateur athletes are a distinct voting minority,
assuming they vote at all. From the perspective of the
democratic process, then, amateur athletes, because of their
limited numbers, would have to rely on non-athlete voters to
galvanize support for legislation that would protect their
interests. Yet the voting majority, because they are not athletes
themselves, very likely is misinformed or poorly informed about
the issues surrounding amateur athletes and the organizations
that regulate them. For instance, the NCAA provides huge
entertainment and in this way generates a large amount of
goodwill. Further, there is a belief that student-athletes are
lucky, that those who are most vulnerable are being given a
chance with their college scholarship. Similarly, in the case of
the USOC and the USADA, there appears to be little interest in
providing accused athletes with greater due process protections.
The voting public seems most concerned with general notions of
catching cheaters and preserving the integrity of the Olympic
Games and has thus far shown little interest in making sure that
those caught really are cheaters and that they are treated fairly.
Accordingly, given their circumstances, it is unlikely that the
amateur athletes affected by the actions of the NCAA, USOC,
and USADA will have the collective power to influence Congress
and secure federal legislation that would protect their rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article makes the claim that the law's failure to account
for new realities of state power in amateur athletics, through a
static conception of the USOC and the NCAA's status for
constitutional purposes, has important consequences for both the
individuals regulated by the USOC, the NCAA, and now the
USADA as well as the entities themselves. Perhaps the most
important consequence is that the state action doctrine's failure
in the amateur sports context has meant not only that state
power exercised in this area remains unconstrained by the
Constitution, but it invites further state involvement without
corresponding constitutional limitation. Such a result, as
evidenced by the formation and operation of the USADA, is
particularly troubling in this new anti-doping era, as amateur
sports organizations, with the power and prestige of the state,
[Vol. 82:183
are taking actions that implicate significant privacy, Equal
Protection and Due Process rights. And they are taking actions
that are only made possible because the federal government is in
a "unique" relationship with the USADA, making government
tools available so that the USADA can sanction athletes who
could otherwise not be sanctioned.
It is far from clear whether constitutional litigation brought
by an amateur athlete or others against the NCAA, the USOC, or
the USADA ultimately would be successful. However, this
Article argues that merely acknowledging that the Constitution
applies to these entities is a success. That is, regardless of
whether in a given situation, for example, due process would
demand more protection than an athlete received, the litigation
would be worthwhile because it would have acknowledged the
state power and presence in amateur athletic regulation. This
Article therefore argues that the time has come to rethink our
approach to state action with respect to amateur sports, not only
to check the state power that is currently exercised in this
context, but to discourage a further expansion of state power
without corresponding constitutional protections. Such an
approach will enhance the legitimacy of our most prominent
amateur sports organizations by remaining true to the Supreme
Court's promise that above all, the state action doctrine is meant
to acknowledge state power in all of its various forms.
251
251 Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995).
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